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With mounting evidence that a coordinated attack by its Arab
neighbors was imminent,1 Israel confronted a truism in
international law: the prima facie illegality of any initiation of
armed hostilities absent authorization by the United Nations
(―U.N.‖) Security Council.2 Constrained by the obligation to
conform its conduct to the use-of-force legal framework
enshrined in the U.N. Charter,3 Israel was ultimately required
to choose between two legal courses of action. It could have
presented the evidence of the imminent attack to the U.N.
Security Council in an effort to obtain international sanction
and perhaps assistance in preventing the attack; or, as it
ultimately chose to do, it could have invoked the inherent right
of self-defense codified in Article 51 of the Charter and thus act
unilaterally to defend itself from what it concluded was an
imminent attack.4
Neither of these options was especially desirable for Israel
from the perspective of international legitimacy. Ideally, a
state in Israel‘s position would choose the first option, a
decision consistent with the fundamental international legal
prohibition against aggressive use of force and the underlying
purpose of the U.N. Charter: the prevention of war through the
mechanism of the Security Council‘s collective process.5
Israel‘s decision to act unilaterally6 and to confront the almost
inevitable international approbation produced by a potentially
1. See AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 237-38
(2000).
2. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 182
(4th ed. 2005) (―the general prohibition of the use of inter-State force . . . [is]
part and parcel of customary international law, as well as the law of the
[U.N.] Charter‖).
3. ―The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.‖
U.N. Charter art. 39. See also MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 223-25 (2005) (discussing Article 39).
4. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states, in pertinent part, that ―[n]othing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations . . . .‖ U.N. Charter art. 51. See also O‘CONNELL, supra note
3, at 226 (discussing Article 51).
5. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 278-83 (defining collective process, or
―collective security,‖ as well as discussing its origin).
6. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 241.
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invalid invocation of the right of self-defense reveals, however,
a perceived delta between the ideal and the geostrategic reality
of the U.N. collective security process. In the end, Israel chose
to accept the burden of rebutting the presumption that a
unilateral initiation of armed conflict is illegal, and to stand on
its belief that the pre-emptive strike that initiated the Six Days
War was a lawful act of self-defense.7
Six years later, Israel once again faced mounting evidence
of an imminent, coordinated attack from its Arab neighbors.8
Unlike 1967, however, the price of fighting the international
legitimacy struggle at this time outweighed the perceived
strategic value of a pre-emptive strike. As a result, Israel
prepared for the inevitable and chose to forgo the military
advantage that initiating hostilities would have undoubtedly
offered.9 On Yom Kippur in 1973, the coordinated attack
predicted by Israeli intelligence became a reality, and Israel‘s
decision to avoid the difficult challenge of fighting against not
just a battlefield enemy, but also the presumption of
international illegitimacy, very nearly led to a military and
strategic catastrophe.10 Nonetheless, Israel reaped virtually no
benefit by attempting to claim the high ground of legitimacy
and by waiting to become the victim of actual aggression.
Instead, the collective security mechanism of the U.N.
remained stalemated and Israel once again fought alone to
achieve its strategic objective—only this time, by also having
handed to its enemies precious operational initiative.11 When
confronting subsequent threats, and equipped with the
experience of pursuing both options, Israel saw little merit in
foregoing a preventive self-defense legal strategy. Thus, in
1981, when the nation once again faced an imminent threat,
7. Id. at 241-42. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 192 (arguing that
―Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow . . . but
was entitled to resort to self-defence as soon as possible‖).
8. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 319 (noting that Israel ―had exceptionally
detailed and precise information about the military capabilities and
operational plans of the enemy‖).
9. Cf. id. (arguing that, rather than choosing to forgo the initiation of
hostilities, Israel simply failed to anticipate the attack because its
intelligence branch misread the available information).
10. See id. (―Military history offers few parallels for strategic surprise as
complete as that achieved by Egypt and Syria . . . . [T]he Arab attack
represented not just an intelligence failure but, above all, a policy failure.‖).
11. See id. at 318-19.
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Israel asserted the provisions of Article 51 to justify airstrikes
against an Iraqi nuclear facility.12 This pattern has continued
as the legal basis for virtually all military actions launched by
Israel since 1973.
Thirty years later, the United States faced a similar
dilemma. Convinced that Iraq was developing and stockpiling
weapons of mass destruction (―WMD‖), and that those weapons
could easily end up in the hands of transnational terrorists for
use against the U.S. homeland, President George W. Bush
concluded that military action to eliminate the regime of
Saddam Hussein was essential to protect the nation.13 In
retrospect, it is almost universally accepted that once he
concluded that this threat existed, war against Iraq became
inevitable.14 What was not inevitable, however, was that the
U.N. Security Council would sanction such action under the
authority of Chapter VII of the Charter. Nonetheless, despite
an unyielding belief that Iraqi WMD posed a legitimate
threat,15 the United States, unlike Israel in 1967 and 1981,
chose to pursue the path of collective security rather than that
of inherent self-defense as the legal basis for accomplishing its
strategic objective.16
The Bush Administration‘s decision to oust Saddam
Hussein from power would ultimately lead to Operation Iraqi
Freedom.17 While President Bush achieved his objective of
12. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47-48 (describing Israel‘s act of selfdefense as ―represent[ing] another round of hostilities in an on-going armed
conflict‖ between Israel and Iraq).
13. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 41-42 (2004) (―The mission
in an Iraq war was clear: Change the regime, overthrow Saddam, eliminate
the threats associated with him—the weapons of mass destruction, the
terrorist ties, the danger he posed to his neighbors . . . .‖).
14. See, e.g., id. at 27.
15. See, e.g., id. at 92 (discussing President Bush‘s State of the Union
Address where he asserts that Iraq has WMD). See also Address Before a
Joint Session of Congress of the State of the Union, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 82
(Jan. 28, 2003).
16. See WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 284-85 (discussing Secretary of
State Colin Powell‘s unsuccessful meeting with the U.N. Security Council and
the formation of the ―coalition of the willing‖). See also infra note 38
(discussing the ―coalition of the willing‖).
17. See Address to the Nation on Iraq, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 281, 281-82
(Mar. 19, 2003) (announcing the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom).
See also O‘CONNELL, supra note 3, at 66-68 (discussing the March 19, 2003
Presidential Address); infra note 37.
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eliminating the Hussein regime, he utterly failed in his effort
to obtain Security Council authorization for this action.18 This
ultimately led to the creation of the ―coalition of the willing‖19
and an assertion of pre-existing Security Council
authorization20 that was regarded by most scholars and experts
as incredible.21 Thus, in the eyes of many, Operation Iraqi
Freedom destroyed not only the Iraqi military, but the
credibility of the United States as a nation committed to
international rule of law. The perception of illegality regarding
the United States‘s decision to initiate the war ran so deep that
even the Secretary General of the United Nations condemned
the action as a violation of international law.22
From a pure international law perspective, the decision of
the United States to persist in its collective security theory of
legality is certainly understandable. Although invocation of
the 1990 Security Council authorization to use force against
Iraq23 provided a dubious legal basis for Operation Iraqi
Freedom, it nonetheless reflected a commitment to the
collective security paradigm of the U.N. Charter. It was the
United States, after all, that submitted the matter to the
Security Council, which essentially estopped the United States
from then asserting an independent right of self-defense as a
legal basis for its action. Such a view is consistent with the
general understanding of the relationship between the inherent
right of self-defense and the collective security mechanism
established by the Charter.24

18. See WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 284-85.
19. See id. at 285; infra note 37.
20. See O‘CONNELL, supra note 3, at 54-55.
21. Critics argue that the ad hoc arrangements between the United
States, Micronesia, and Mongolia had little credibility as a coalition, and that
the ―coalition of the willing,‖ see infra note 38, failed to meet the qualitative
requirements of a multilateral intervention, see Sarah E. Kreps, Multilateral
Military Interventions: Theory and Practice, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 573, 575 (20082009).
22. See Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBCNEWS.COM, Sept. 16, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3661134.stm (―The United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan has told the BBC the US-led invasion of Iraq was an
illegal act that contravened the UN charter.‖).
23. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991) (delineating the
terms and conditions of the ceasefire that Iraq was to be bound by and thus
ending the First Gulf War).
24. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 286.
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But international law—and, in particular, the law related
to the use of force by States—is not an island unto itself. As
events related to the war served to remind the United States
and the world, strategic legitimacy and international law are
inextricably intertwined. As Professor Anthony D‘Amato so
eloquently noted:
The question the political analyst will ask . . . is
not simply whether the acts at issue have
violated some preexisting norm but rather,
whether expectations entertained by effective
elites about what is permissible may be inferred
from their behavior. The question is eminently
practical, for even those who do not regularly use
the word ―law‖ in their discourse, and even those
who snicker when others use it, must make
estimates about the subjectivities of allies and
adversaries
alike.
These
subjectivities
necessarily include what those actors think is
right. In a world in which allies and adversaries
do not submit to intensive interviews and rarely
volunteer or are permitted to tell the whole truth
(if any part of it), deeds—actions and reactions—
become one of the few available windows to what
others are thinking, either consciously or
unconsciously.25
It seems undeniable that decisions about the legality of
military force have such profound influence on the perception
of international legitimacy. The challenges for decision-makers
confronted with the competing options of inherent self-defense
and collective security are daunting. In addition to the
strategic cost-and-benefit calculus, the legal and political
ambiguity surrounding the concept of self-defense adds
significant complexity to the process. Neither has the United
Nations authoritatively narrowed down the interpretation of
Article 51, nor do commonly accepted definitions exist to
provide a clear distinction between preemption and preventive

25. INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 53-54 (Anthony D‘Amato ed., 1994).
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war.26 Like Israel decades before, the United States confronted
a choice between the two competing theories of legality; and, as
with Israel, neither seemed ideal. Asserting a right of selfdefense as a legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom would
have undoubtedly been considered overbroad by a majority of
legal experts, and arguably inconsistent with the Charter
paradigm once the Security Council had ―seized‖ the issue of
Iraq. But while we have learned much about the invalidity of
the factual basis for launching the war since 2003, we have also
learned that the U.S. effort to operate within the collective
security framework of the United Nations fared little better.
Indeed, much ink has been spilt by international law scholars
and experts on the invalidity of the ―authorization
resurrection‖ theory ultimately adopted by the United States.27
What has received far less attention is the question of
whether, from a broader perspective of international relations,
the United States might have been better served by following
the same course of action adopted by Israel in 1967. There is
virtually no question that an assertion of a right of self-defense
as its legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom would have
earned the United States widespread criticism, particularly
from legal scholars. But did the United States ultimately lose
more than it gained by accepting the practical burden of
convincing the Security Council that an authorization for the
use of force was justified? What seems clear is that either
―legal basis‖ course of action involved risk once the necessity
26. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL REPORT SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PREEMPTIVE USE OF FORCE
AGAINST
IRAQ
3
(2003),
available
at

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21314_20020923.pdf (―The exact scope of
this right of self-defense . . . has been the subject of ongoing debate.‖). See
also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 183 (discussing competing interpretations of
Article 51).
27. See generally, e.g., William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”:
A Natural Law Justification For the Bush Doctrine of Preventative War, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2004); Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman,
Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict: Editors‟ Introduction, 97 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 553 (2003); Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq,
92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004); Winton P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush
National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 375
(2004); Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary
International Law?, 27 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (2004); Jorge
Alberto Ramirez, Iraq War: Anticipatory Self-Defense or Unlawful
Unilateralism?, 34 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 1 (2003).
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for war had been determined. Thus, it seems fair to ask
whether asserting a self-defense basis for action could have
produced second- and third-order effects that might have
served U.S. and coalition interests better than pursuing the
collective security course of action.
The events surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom, like
those surrounding the alternative approaches adopted by Israel
decades earlier, raise an interesting and potentially important
question: should a State that confronts what it believes is an
inevitable and necessary use of force to protect its self-interest
always assume the burden of persuasion for collective action?
If, as indicated by its subsequent actions, the United States did
not consider such an authorization necessary,28 might it have
been possible, at least in practical terms, to essentially shift
the burden of persuasion to opponents of military action by
invoking the right of self-defense, even if that invocation was
considered by many to be premature? Considering the reality
that both the United States and the United Kingdom had
already committed politically to the conflict,29 it is clear that
any proposed U.N. Security Council resolution in opposition to
the operation would have fallen victim to veto. Thus, while
critics could have challenged the assertion of a self-defensebased right of action, it was not conceivable that their
opposition could have been confirmed in the form of a U.N.
Security Council resolution condemning that invocation. How
then might this burden-shifting have impacted the perception
of legality for the inevitable operation?
It is of course difficult in retrospect to ignore the reality of
what actually transpired during the course of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and in particular, the failure of the United States to
validate its assumption that Iraq was continuing to develop
WMD.30 But it is equally important to critique the process
adopted by the United States from a prospective, rather than
retrospective, point of view. This Article will explore the
relationship between the application of the U.N. Charter‘s use
of force provisions31 and how compliance with those provisions
28. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 184 (describing President
Bush‘s ―if-you-don‘t-we-will challenge to the UN‖).
29. See id. at 178.
30. Id. at 435.
31. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (―All Members shall refrain in their
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impacts the ―International Public Information‖32 effort related
to the decision of a state or states to use military force. To this
end, the United States‘s decision to seek U.N. Security Council
authorization for the intervention in Iraq will serve as an
illustration and provide context for the discussion.
The
purpose here is not to validate or condemn this decision.
Indeed, there are many plausible reasons why a state might
pursue such a course of action, even when it assumes that force
can be employed based on an independent source of legality,
such as the inherent right of self-defense.33 Instead, the
purpose of the Article is to simply explore whether the
assumption that a state that plans to use force must always
seek Security Council authorization is overbroad, and whether
the structure of the U.N. Charter might even provide a subtle
incentive for states facing a perceived threat to bypass the
collective security apparatus in favor of assertions of selfdefense, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to opponents
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state . . . .‖). See also DINSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 85 (discussing Article 2).
32. International Public Information is the subject of ―a secret
Presidential Decision Directive—PPD 68,‖ which was issued by President
Clinton in 1999. International Public Information (IPI) Presidential Decision
Directive PPD 68 (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd68.htm. The purpose of the Directive was to leverage all components of the
U.S. government in the effort to influence the international perception of U.S.
policy and actions. Id. According to the Federation of American Scientists:
The International Public Information [IPI] System is
designed to ―influence foreign audiences‖ in support of US
foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of
the United States. The intent is ―to enhance U.S. security,
bolster America‘s economic prosperity and to promote
democracy abroad,‖ according to the IPI Core Group
Charter. The Group‘s charter statess [sic] that IPI control
over ―international military information‖ is intended to
―influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups and individuals.‖ The IPIG will
encourage the United Nations and other international
organizations to make ―effective use of IPI . . . in support of
multilateral peacekeeping.‖
Id.
33. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 175 (calling self-defense a
―fundamental right of States‖ for states‘ survival).
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of the conflict.
The authors acknowledge at the outset that considering
the potential information payoff derived from such a policy and
legal strategy might appear fundamentally inconsistent with
the Charter‘s use-of-force legal framework.34 But our purpose
is neither to endorse nor condemn that framework. Instead, it
is simply to acknowledge and consider the broader
consequences produced by how states interpret and invoke that
framework.
Nor do we believe that this is a purely
retrospective issue. Indeed, our purpose is more prospective.
Like Israel in 1967 and President Bush in 2003, it seems that
the United States, South Korea, and other like-minded allies
are presently confronting their own potential use-of-force
dilemma created by an increasingly bellicose and dangerously
armed North Korea.35 If, at some point, the United States and
its allies, committed to preventing the dangerous reality of a
nuclear capable North Korea, decide that military action is
necessary, would presentation of the issue to the U.N. Security
Council be the wisest course of action? It would certainly be
difficult to ignore the reality that the Council is now seized of
the issue.36 But it would also be difficult to ignore the reality
that several permanent members would be highly unlikely to
support an authorization for the use of force against North
Korea.
If, and the authors certainly hope this will not be the case,
President Obama reaches his own ―decisive point‖ for taking
military action, would a more effective course of action be to
follow the Israeli approach from 1967? Like Israel‘s actions,
such an approach would undoubtedly produce widespread
criticism. But would military action following a failed attempt
to obtain Security Council authorization be more damaging to
the overall perception of credibility? This is not an easy
question to resolve, but if this Article does nothing more than
to highlight the geostrategic reality that selecting a legal
34. See id. at 85.
35. See, e.g., Kwang-Tae Kim, South Korea Says North Fires Seven
Missiles
Off
East
Coast,
CHINAPOST.COM,
July
5,
2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional-news/2009/07/05/214934/SouthKorea.htm.
36. See S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) (The
Security Council decided to ―remain actively seized of the matter‖ involving
North Korea‘s nuclear program).
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course of action is far from a ―zero sum‖ game—that following
either course of action involves the inherent risk of perceived
illegitimacy, and therefore that it might be logical to select the
choice that mitigates that risk to the greatest extent possible—
the authors will have accomplished their limited purpose.
International Legality and National Security
Operation Iraqi Freedom37 provides a classic example of
the profound relationship between the perception of compliance
with international law and the legitimacy of actions executed to
implement national security objectives. The efforts of the Bush
Administration to create a public perception of international
legitimacy for the conflict— first by seeking to persuade the
U.N. Security Council to authorize military action, and
subsequently, through the conduit of the ―coalition of the
willing‖38 and the not-so-subtle marginalization of the Security
Council39—illustrate that the legal basis for military action is a
critical component in shaping the overall perception of the
legitimacy of state action to implement national security
imperatives.
Complicating the importance of the perception of legality is
the reality that the use of military force to implement national
37. See CATHERINE DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM: STRATEGIES, APPROACHES, RESULTS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, at i
(2009), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (stating that
―Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in
Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of
removing Saddam Hussein‘s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons
of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists.‖). See also
Address to the Nation on Iraq, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 277, 278 (Mar. 17, 2003)
(giving a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons).
38. ―Coalition of the willing‖ is a term first used by President Bush in a
speech at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (―NATO‖) Summit in Prague
in November 2002, in which he said that ―the United States will lead a
coalition of the willing to disarm [Saddam Hussein].‖ Bush: Join Coalition of
the
Willing,
CNN.COM,
Nov.
20,
2002,
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato (the term
was used to refer to the forty-nine countries that verbally or militarily
supported the 2003 invasion).
39. See, e.g., NAT‘L LAWYERS GUILD, ATTACKING IRAQ, SUBVERTING
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
2,
http://www.pegc.us/archive/Organizations/NLG_iraq_fact_sheet.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2009) (noting that Security Council members France, Russia,
and China have consistently opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq).
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or international security interests is rarely without
controversy.40 This is the result of a simple truism: use of force
is today considered a measure of last resort in seeking to
achieve national or international strategic objectives.41
Accordingly, the legitimacy of any employment of combat power
by a state will inevitably be critiqued by testing its compliance
with international law governing the use of force. Operation
Iraqi Freedom and the first Gulf War in many ways reflect
opposite ends of this ―legitimacy‖ spectrum.42 However, the
post-9/11 paradigm of treating transnational threats posed by
non-state actors as ―armed conflicts,‖43 along with the
continued risk of conflict triggered by nuclear proliferation,
suggest that future military actions by the United States and
other states may very well continue to tend towards the
Operation Iraqi Freedom-end of the legitimacy spectrum.
Indeed, the post-9/11 recommendations by the Secretary
General of the United Nations that emphasized the need to
enhance the responsiveness of the United Nations‘ collective
security mechanism to such emerging threats, seems to reflect
this reality.44 However, unless and until such reforms are
implemented, the challenge in executing national security
policy in a manner that is perceived as legitimate under
international law will remain significant.
40. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 124 (stating that ―the criminality of
aggressive war has entrenched itself in an impregnable position in
contemporary international law‖).
41. See id.
42. See id.; O‘CONNELL, supra note 3, at 22-82 (discussing the two
invasions of Iraq as a case study in international legality for the use of force).
43. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian
Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War
on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 796-803 (2008). See also Memorandum from
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision
Regarding Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the
Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf
(articulating
the basis for the conclusion that Al Qaeda detainees are not covered by either
Common Article 2 or the humane treatment obligations of Common Article 3
of the Geneva Convention).
44. See Patrick E. Tyler &.Felicity Barringer, Annan Says U.S. Will
Violate Charter if it Acts Without Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A10
(―Secretary General Kofi Annan warned today that if the United States fails
to win approval from the Security Council for an attack on Iraq,
Washington‘s decision to act alone or outside the Council would violate the
United Nations charter.‖).
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How the international law regarding the use of force
relates to this challenge—or, perhaps more precisely, how
informational burdens of persuasion related to that law impact
the relative perception of legitimacy—is therefore a critical
issue in the intersection between international law and
national security policy. Using the example of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, this Article will question whether the diplomatic and
associated informational courses of action adopted by the Bush
Administration made the most effective use of the pragmatic
burdens of persuasion related to articulating a legitimate legal
basis for armed conflict. The Article will suggest that asserting
an alternate—and, in the view of many, an equally viable45—
theory of international legality might have enhanced the
perceived legitimacy of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Finally, the
essay will consider whether asserting a self-defense right of
action in the face of an emerging threat could functionally shift
the informational burden of persuasion to opponents of the use
of military force, and how such a shift in relation to Operation
Iraqi Freedom might have helped the United States obtain
support—or, at a minimum, mitigate opposition—from
traditional European diplomatic and security partners.
This is not, however, an issue isolated to a retrospective
assessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Indeed, as this Article
was being written, North Korean leaders are threatening war
against the United States, and President Obama has publicly
stated that North Korea‘s nuclear ambitions pose a ―grave
threat‖ to the world,46 and that the nation cannot be permitted
to possess nuclear weapons.47 Should he conclude that the use
of force is necessary to ensure this strategic imperative,
President Obama could soon find himself confronting a
dilemma similar to that faced by his predecessor. Should the
United States seek authorization for such a use of force
45. See generally, e.g., PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS, ANDRU E. WALL & ATA
DINLENC, THE FEDERALIST SOC‘Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, THE JUST
DEMANDS OF PEACE AND SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CASE AGAINST
IRAQ
(2002),
available
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20070325_iraqfinalweb.pdf.
46. United States President Barack Obama & Republic of Korea
President
Lee
Myung-Bak,
Joint
Remarks
(June
16,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obamaand-President-Lee-of-the-Republic-of-Korea-in-Joint-Press-Availability.
47. Id.

13

2010]

INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY

497

through the Security Council? Or would a more effective
course of action be to assert the right to act in individual and
collective self-defense, and thereby shift the burden of
discrediting this assertion to opponents of military action?
Although a ―rearview mirror‖ perspective of Operation Iraqi
Freedom renders it difficult to consider that event as a
paradigm for the cost-benefit equation associated with such a
course of action, the continuing reality of global insecurity
makes it a worthwhile endeavor.
I. Background
Although the United States initially suggested that it
was committed to obtaining authorization for the conflict
through the U.N. Security Council,48 its inability to persuade
fellow Council members that there was a legitimate causus
belli ultimately resulted in a dilemma for the United States. It
was clear to almost all observers that by the time the United
States sought and failed to obtain express Security Council
authorization for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it had already
committed to war. What then could be asserted as a legal basis
for the action? And how could the United States proceed
without implicitly undermining the United Nations collective
security process? The United States‘s answer reflected a
schizophrenic reaction to its failure to obtain authorization. Its
refusal to revert to a pure self-defense theory of legality can be
seen as a validation of the limits of such assertions and a
48. See Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York
City, 2002 PUB. PAPERS 1572, 1576 (Sept. 12, 2002). In his address, President
Bush expressed an intent to work and cooperate with the United Nations in
regards to Iraq:
My Nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to
meet our common challenge. If Iraq‘s regime defies us
again, the world must move to deliberately, decisively to
hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security
Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of
the United States should not be doubted. The Security
Council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of
peace and security will be met—or action will be
unavoidable.
Id.
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commitment to continue to operate through the collective
security process. However, by using the 1990 U.N. Security
Council Resolution authorizing the first Gulf War49 as a legal
basis for its 2003 action, in spite of the fact that the Security
Council had considered and rejected the call for a new ―all
necessary means‖ authorization,50 the United States impliedly
rejected the United Nations‘ use-of-force authorization process.
Additionally, as if to complicate matters more, even after it
sought a ―resurrected‖ Resolution 687 authority for action, the
United States continued to suggest an independent right of
individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in the
following excerpt from a letter submitted by the United States
to the Security Council immediately after initiating military
action to depose Saddam Hussein:
Iraq repeatedly has refused, over a
protracted period of time, to respond to
diplomatic overtures, economic sanctions and
other peaceful means, designed to help bring
about Iraqi compliance with its obligations to
disarm and to permit full inspection of its
weapons of mass destruction and related
programmes. The actions that coalition forces
are undertaking are an appropriate response.
They are necessary steps to defend the United
States and the international community from the
threat posed by Iraq and to restore international
peace and security in the area. Further delay
would simply allow Iraq to continue its unlawful
and threatening conduct.51
While the public posture of the Bush Administration
suggested that the final U.N. Security Council Resolution,
which referred to ―serious consequences‖ for continued
49. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 23.
50. See generally SEAN D. MURPHY, 2 UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2002-2004 (2005).
51. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Letter from the
Permanent Representative] (emphasis added).
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resistance to inspections,52 served as a justification for the
conflict, that Resolution standing alone never served as the
United States‘s official theory of international legality.53
Instead, in what many experts perceived as an act of
desperation,54 the United States asserted that the ―serious
breach‖ language of Security Council Resolution 1441
essentially nullified the cease-fire of 1991, thereby resurrecting
the original 1990 Resolution 687‘s ―all necessary means‖
authorization as a legal basis for military action.55 While this
52. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (stating
that ―the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious
consequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations‖).
53. See generally John C. Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97
AM. J. INT‘L L. 563 (2003).
54. See Mary Ellen O‘Connell, Addendum to Armed Force in Iraq: Issues
of
Legality,
AM.
SOC‘Y
INT‘L
L.
INSIGHTS
(2003),
http://www.asil.org/insigh99a1.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
The Council passed resolution 1441 on November 12,
2002, but it provided no new authorization for using force.
It states in paragraph 12 that a meeting of the Security
Council will be the first step upon a report by inspectors
that Iraq obstructed their activities. Russia, France and
China have all stated they understood resolution 1441
permitted no automatic use of force. Subsequently, in fact,
members of the Council were unwilling to adopt a proposed
resolution that would authorize force to enforce Iraqi
disarmament. Resolution 1441 states affirmatively that in
the event of a material breach by Iraq of its obligations to
cooperate, serious consequences would follow. But, again,
the resolution does not say what serious consequences
would follow. Nor did it provide any right of unilateral
US/UK enforcement.
Id.
55. See Letter from the Permanent Representative, supra note 51.
According to this letter:
Coalition forces have commenced military operations in
Iraq. These operations are necessary in view of Iraq‘s
continued material breaches of its disarmament obligations
under relevant Security Council resolutions, including
resolution 1441 (2002). The operations are substantial and
will secure compliance with those obligations. In carrying
out these operations, our forces will take all reasonable
precautions to avoid civilian casualties.
The actions being taken are authorized under existing
Council resolutions, including its resolutions 678 (1990) and
687 (1991). Resolution 687 (1991) imposed a series of
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may have been a plausible theory of legality, many other
governments
obviously
considered
it
disingenuous,56
particularly because the United States had aggressively
pursued a new ―use of force‖ resolution even after passage of
the ―serious consequences‖ resolution,57 but had abandoned
that effort when failure seemed inevitable.58
In seeking a Security Council resolution to authorize the
conflict during its march to war, the United States clearly
obligations on Iraq, including, most importantly, extensive
disarmament obligations, that were conditions of the
ceasefire established under it. It has been long recognized
and understood that a material breach of these obligations
removes the basis of the ceasefire and revives the authority
to use force under resolution 678 (1990). This has been the
basis for coalition use of force in the past and has been
accepted by the Council, as evidenced, for example, by the
Secretary-General‘s public announcement in January 1993
following Iraq‘s material breach of resolution 687 (1991)
that coalition forces had received a mandate from the
Council to use force according to resolution 678 (1990).
Id. See also S.C. Res. 687, supra note 23. Several of the conditions listed in
Resolution 687 were later violated and then used by the Bush Administration
as support for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
56. See NAT‘L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 39.
Resolution 1441 represents a compromise between the
French/Russian view and the American/British perspective.
The Council acquiesced to the U.S. by deciding that Iraq
―was and remains‖ in ―material breach‖ of prior resolutions,
including Resolution 687. It also decided that any future
―false statements or omissions . . . and failure by Iraq at any
time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further
material breach.‖ Finally, ¶13 of the Resolution recalls that
the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face
―serious consequences‖ as a result of its continued violation
of its obligations. The ―material breach‖ and ―serious
consequences‖ language will be used by the United States to
argue that the Security Council has essentially allowed it to
use force in response to any Iraqi non-compliance.
Moreover, the United States can also argue that the
Resolution does not explicitly require another Council vote
on authorization of military force, as the French and
Russians had sought.
Id. at 2.
57. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52.
58. See Yoo, supra note 53, at 563.
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accepted the informational burden of persuading other
members of the Security Council that military action was
necessary to oust Saddam Hussein from power and to facilitate
the accomplishment of the United States‘s national strategic
objectives. In retrospect, it is appropriate to question whether
accepting this burden ultimately undermined the legality, as
well as the legitimacy, for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Would it
have been more effective to ―shift‖ this burden to those
members of the Security Council opposed to military action by
asserting an alternative legal basis? While this essay will
necessarily summarize alternate legal theories for the conflict,
it is not the intent of the authors to provide a comprehensive
analysis of this body of law. Instead, our purpose is to
highlight the relationship between the selection of a theory of
legality for the use of force as it relates to emerging threats and
the development of international support for responsive
military actions. Ultimately, what we suggest is that, because
there was no theory of legality immune to legitimate criticism,
adopting a theory that shifted the burden of persuasion to
those opposed to the conflict might have substantially
contributed to the political objective of mobilizing international
support for the conflict, or, at a minimum, mitigated the risk of
international opposition.
II. Theories of International Legality for the Use of Force59
Prior to World War I, the authority to wage war was
considered a sovereign prerogative of nation-states.60 While
59. This article is based on the premise that the U.N. Charter use-offorce paradigm will continue to be regarded by the international community
as the definitive source of authority for the legal employment of force by
states, and that the United States will continue to aver from ―outside the
Charter‖ theories of legality for the use of force. For an excellent analysis of
why the use-of-force paradigm reflected in the U.N. Charter is no longer
viable, either legally or pragmatically, see Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of
Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 539 (2001-2002) (arguing that
the concept of self-defense reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is
inconsistent with the pre- and post-Charter practice of states, and with the
pragmatic needs of national security).
60. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 75 (stating that ―the predominant
conviction in the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century was that every
State had a right—namely, an interest protected by international law—to
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international
law
did
establish
certain
procedural
61
requirements related to such decisions and provided the
authority for determining the legal effects of war,62 there was
virtually no requirement that states establish an international
legal basis for their decisions to wage war. Following World
War I, the international community began to alter this
paradigm in an attempt to limit the resort to war as a means of
achieving state objectives. These efforts culminated in two
groundbreaking—but ultimately ineffective—international
legal developments. The first was the attempt to establish a
collective security mechanism in the form of the League of
Nations.63 The second was the attempt to outlaw war by treaty
in the form of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.64 Unfortunately, the
well intentioned efforts of the international community to
ensure that World War I was truly the ―war to end all wars‖65
proved ineffective, and the world once again descended into the
abyss of global conflict. While World War II clearly revealed
the failures of the prior efforts to eliminate war as a tool of
national policy, it also resulted in a renewed commitment to
establish a truly effective source of international regulation on
the use of force.66 The end result of this commitment was the
embark upon war whenever it pleased‖).
61. See, e.g., The Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 205 Consol. T.S. 263 (Third Hague Convention)
(mandating a declaration of war).
62. See Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, Consol. T.S. 277 (Fourth Hague Convention).
63. See League of Nations Covenant.
64. See Treaty between the United States and Other Powers providing
for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (KelloggBriand Pact), U.S.-Fr., Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
65. President Woodrow Wilson is generally regarded as given authorship
to this quote. See, e.g., RALPH KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER 240-41 (2006). See
also, e.g., EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE WAR TO END ALL WARS: THE AMERICAN
MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR I (1998).
66. See INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 22-23
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960). See also U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. The U.N.
Charter states that some of the purposes of the U.N. include:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
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creation of the United Nations, and the vesting of that body
with the principal responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.67
The Charter of the United Nations is generally regarded
today as establishing the exclusive international legal criteria
for determining—and by implication, critiquing—the legality of
the use of force by states.68 The legal authority for states to use
force is found in two principal articles of that treaty. The first
is Article 42, which provides that:
Should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.69
Because this article is found in Chapter VII of the Charter,
Security Council resolutions invoking the authority of this
article are customarily referred to as ―Chapter VII‖ mandates,
and historically include the requisite ―all necessary means‖
language.
However, it is essential to understand the relationship
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace . . . .‖
Id.
67. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 47 (1990).
68. While there have always been, and continue to be, theories of use-offorce legality ―outside‖ the Charter paradigm—such as a customary
international law right of humanitarian intervention—analysis of such
theories is beyond the scope of this Article. Furthermore, there is no
indication that the United States has ever officially endorsed the validity of
such ―outside the Charter‖ theories of legality. For a comprehensive analysis
of the international legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom, see Michael N.
Schmitt, The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under International Law, 3
J. MILITARY ETHICS 82 (2004).
69. U.N. Charter art. 42.
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between this article and other articles involving the Security
Council‘s authority to maintain international peace and
security.70 Because the Charter paradigm endeavors to ensure
that resort to force in international relations is a genuine
measure of last resort, prior to authorizing member states to
use force under the provisions of Article 42, the Security
Council must satisfy two conditions precedent. First, the
Council must make a finding pursuant to Article 39 that there
has been a ―threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.‖71 Second, the Council must make a finding that
measures short of the use of force (such as sanctions,
embargoes, etc.) would either be inadequate, or have already
proved to be inadequate.72 Thus, while there is no requirement
that the Council exhaust all non-use-of-force-methods prior to
authorizing use of force to restore or maintain international
peace and security, there must be an explicit determination by
the Council that the use of anything short of force would be
ineffective.
The second provision of the Charter related to the use of
force is Article 51, which provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore
70. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 2.
71. U.N. Charter art. 39. This article, also known as the ―Collective
Peace Theory,‖ states that ―[t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.‖
72. Id. art. 42.
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international peace and security.73
Article 51 includes several critical sub-provisions related to
the authority of states to engage in armed conflict. First and
foremost, it was included in the Charter as an express
recognition that, even though the Security Council was vested
with ―primary‖74 responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, member states would never
be divested of their individual right to defend themselves
against aggression. Second, this article explicitly endorsed the
authority of states to act collectively in response to aggression.
Prior to this development, there was virtually no dispute that
states had the authority to defend themselves against
aggression.75 Indeed, the article‘s reference to an ―inherent‖
right has traditionally been regarded as an acknowledgment
that the authority to act in self-defense was an essential aspect
of sovereignty, and not a ―right‖ established by the Charter.76
But Article 51 went one step further by acknowledging the
right of collective self-defense.77 In short, this was an explicit
effort to allow the ―good‖ big guys to help the ―good‖ little guys
against the ―bad‖ big guys—a theory that has been employed
by the United States to justify initial actions in several major
conflicts, including Korea, Vietnam, and the first Gulf War.78
It seems clear from the terms of the article that exercise of this
right was intended to be a temporary measure pending
assumption of the security situation by the Security Council.
However, there is no stated limit to the recognized authority of
states to act in their own self-defense or in collective defense
against aggression.

73. Id. art. 51.
74. Id. See also U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (stating that ―[i]n order to
ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf‖).
75. See Glennon, supra note 59, at 541-42 (discussing the traditionally
understood requirement of ―armed attack‖ as the trigger for the right of selfdefense).
76. See Leo Van Den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International
Law, 19 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 69, 73 (2003).
77. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 178-79.
78. See generally id.
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Article 51 has
been the ―trigger‖ for when a state or states may rely on this
authority for the use of force.79 The plain language of the
article refers to an ―armed attack‖ as the condition precedent
for the lawful invocation of this authority.80 However, this
authority has historically been interpreted more expansively
than this language suggests.81 Under customarily accepted
theories of international law, the ―armed attack‖ provision is
satisfied when such an attack is ―imminent.‖82 Although the
definition of this term has always been the source of some
debate around the edges, the essence of the ―imminent attack‖
standard has historically been understood as allowing states to
act in individual or collective self-defense when they determine
that an act of illegal aggression is immediately impending and
inevitable.83
Historically, narrowly defining the scope of individual and
collective self-defense authority was considered essential to
prevent abuse of that authority as a subterfuge for acts of

79. See id. at 183 (arguing that states may only rely upon self-defense as
authority for a use of force where an ―armed attack‖ has, in fact, occurred).
80. U.N. Charter art. 51.
81. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 2; Van Den Hole, supra note 76.
82. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 182 (suggesting that ―the imminence
of an armed attack . . . does indeed justify an early response by way of
interceptive self-defence‖). See also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf; Yoo, supra
note 53, at 563, 571-72. The George W. Bush Administration articulated the
U.S. position post- 9/11, in regards to the issue of ―imminence‖:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations
need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take
action to defend themselves against forces that present an
imminent danger of attack.
Legal scholars and
international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most
often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack.
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra, at 15.
83. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES (1963). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 182 (stressing
that a state may only assert self-defense as a lawful basis for a use of force
when there is an imminent armed attack and there is ―no longer a mere
threat‖).
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illegal aggression.84
However, it seems apparent that
endorsing a limited scope of self-defense was only one aspect of
preventing such abuse. The language of Article 51 illustrates a
construct that acknowledges the inherent authority of states to
make the initial judgment of when an action of self-defense is
authorized, but then relies upon the collective security
mechanism established by the Charter—i.e., the Security
Council—to critique that judgment, and, where necessary, take
actions to reverse an unjustified assertion of the inherent right
of self-defense.85 Accordingly, any state asserting an inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense pursuant to Article
51, as a legal basis for military action, is obligated to
immediately report the action to the Security Council.86 The
authority for such action may be subsequently superseded if, in
response to such a report, the Security Council authorizes
measures to restore international peace and security. Thus,
the Security Council serves as the primary monitor for the
legitimate exercise of Article 51 authority.87
It is therefore apparent that international law does not
grant states carte blanche authority to invoke the inherent
84. See generally Van Den Hole, supra note 76.
85. The text of Article 51 reflects an obvious balance between the
authority of states to make this initial self-defense judgment and the
complementary authority of the Security Council to critique that judgment
and respond as it deems necessary to address the security situation.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
86. Id.
87. See id. arts. 24, 39. Article 39 states that ―[t]he Security Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security.‖ U.N. Charter art. 39.
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right of individual or collective self-defense, but instead, places
limits on that right through both customary definitions related
to legitimate invocations and the grant of authority to the
Security Council to functionally assume authority over
situations triggering state invocation of this right. However, it
is equally apparent that states are vested with the authority—
and, from their individual perspectives, the obligation—to
interpret conditions establishing a prima facie trigger of this
right. Like the invocation of any right provided by law, the
further removed the invocation becomes from accepted
definitions, the more difficult it becomes for the party invoking
the law to sustain support for that interpretation. However,
because of the deliberate and unquestioned intertwining of
state authority to act in self-defense and Security Council
authority to ensure international peace and security, the
practical inter-relationship of these authorities produces
significant informational second- and third-order effects.
III. Burdens of Persuasion and the U.S. Approach to Operation
Iraqi Freedom
Reflecting back on the strategy employed by the United
States to garner international support for military action
against Iraq, it is virtually impossible to dispute an initial
policy preference in favor of obtaining a use-of-force
authorization from the Security Council. To this end, the
United States effectively lobbied the Council to pass Resolution
1441.88 This Resolution, which was touted extensively by the
Bush Administration during the build-up to the conflict, noted
Iraq‘s continuing violation of previous Security Council
Resolutions; found Iraq in ―material breach‖ of prior obligations
88. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52. The Security Council held Iraq in
―material breach‖ of its obligations under previous resolutions and
consequently decided to afford it a ―final opportunity to comply‖ with its
disarmament obligations, which had been established in Resolution 687
(1991). Id. ¶ 2. See also S.C. Res. 687, supra note 23. By its unanimous
adoption of Resolution 1441, the Council ordered that the resumed
inspections begin within forty-five days, and also decided that it would
convene immediately upon the receipt of any reports from inspection
authorities stating that Iraq was interfering with their activities. S.C. Res.
1441, supra note 52, ¶ 5. It recalled, in that context, that the Council had
repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face ―serious consequences‖ as a result
of continued violations. Id. ¶ 13.
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imposed by the Security Council; granted Iraq a ―final
opportunity to comply with . . . disarmament obligations‖;89 and
―recalled‖ that the Security Council had repeatedly warned
Iraq that it could face ―serious consequences‖ for continued
non-compliance with prior Security Council Resolutions.90
Experts in international law would ostensibly have a
simple explanation for why the United States chose the
―collective security‖ path: it was the path most consistent with
international law.
This indeed may be true, especially
considering the undisputed fact that the United States had
been working within that process since the crisis with Iraq
began in 1990. However, it is also undisputed that, by
following that path, the United States in effect accepted a
burden of persuasion—a burden that it ultimately failed to
satisfy.91 Contrary to the arguments ultimately advanced by
the United States and other members of the Coalition, it is
highly questionable whether Resolution 1441 provided a
genuine legal basis for military action against Iraq.92 In fact,
although the Bush Administration routinely cited the ―material
breach‖ and ―serious consequences‖ language of that
Resolution, the United States never claimed that the
Resolution, standing alone, established such a basis. Even
after failing to secure a subsequent ―all necessary means‖
resolution from the Security Council, with the accordant
declaration by President Bush that the Security Council had
―not lived up to its responsibilities,‖93 the United States
continued to assert a basis of international legality firmly
rooted in the U.N. Charter use-of-force paradigm. In a scarcely
publicized letter issued after the initiation of combat operations
in Iraq and written by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
John Negroponte to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, the United States cited as its international legal basis
for the action the prior ―all necessary means‖ Security Council
resolution from the first Gulf War:

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52, ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 13.
See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 53, at 563.
See generally Schmitt, supra note 68.
Address to the Nation on Iraq, supra note 37.
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The actions being taken are authorized under
existing Council resolutions: including resolution
678 (1990) and resolution 687 (1991). Resolution
687 imposed a series of obligations on Iraq,
including,
most
importantly,
extensive
disarmament obligations, that were the
conditions of the cease-fire established under it.
It has been long recognized and understood that
a material breach of these obligations removes
the basis of the ceasefire and revives the
authority to use force under resolution 678
(1990). This has been the basis for coalition use
of force in the past and has been accepted by the
Council, as evidenced, for example, by the
Secretary General‘s public announcement in
January 1993 following Iraq‘s material breach of
resolution 687 (1991) that coalition forces had
received a mandate from the Council to use force
according to resolution 678 (1990).94
This letter indicates quite persuasively that the United
States was unwilling to pursue an ―extra-Charter‖ legal theory
for Operation Iraqi Freedom.95 However, this excerpt also
provides conclusive evidence of the Bush Administration‘s
recognition that Resolution 1441 did not, standing alone,
provide the authority to initiate hostilities against Iraq, but
only added weight to the Resolution 687 ―resurrection‖
argument, to which Coalition members were forced to resort.
The failure of the United States to secure passage of a new
use-of-force resolution following the unanimous passage of
Resolution 1441, and the subsequent need to resort to reliance
on Resolutions 67896 and 687 as a legal basis for military action
94. Letter from the Permanent Representative, supra note 51.
95. See Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97
AM. J. INT‘L L. 804, 807 (2003) (―Furthermore, hegemonist policies were
placed within, and not outside, the law. Importantly, all the actors involved .
. . argued from within, not outside, the system. This practice underlines that
the normativity of the Charter framework was not itself called into
question.‖).
96. S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (authorizing states to use
―all necessary means to uphold and implement‖ prior resolutions directing
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait).
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against Iraq, reveals the consequence of accepting the collective
security burden of persuasion. There is virtually no doubt that
the United States recognized, even at the time of its passage,
that Resolution 1441 failed to provide sufficient authority for
use of force against Iraq. Indeed, the Resolution was explicit in
its requirement that the Security Council would take
additional action in the event of further Iraqi non-compliance,
and that other permanent members of the Council had relied
upon this to support their views on the invalidity of a
subsequent resort to Resolution 687.97 Instead, it appears that
97. See Joint Declaration From Russia, Germany and France (Feb. 11,
2003)
(Russ.),
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/900b2c3ac91734634325698f002d9dcf/3fbc1d99baf
e867843256cca004a4865?OpenDocument. This declaration noted:
Russia, Germany and France, in close coordination,
reaffirm that disarming Iraq, in accordance with the
relevant UN resolutions since U.N. Resolution 687, is the
common objective of the international community and that
it must be achieved as soon as possible.
There is a debate on how this should be done. This
debate must continue in the spirit of friendship and respect
that characterises our relations with the United States and
other countries. Any solution must be inspired by the
principles of the United Nations charter as were recently
quoted by the secretary general Kofi Annan.
U.N. Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the U.N.
Security Council, provides a framework of which the
potential has not yet been thoroughly exploited.
The inspections led by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have already
produced results. Russia, Germany and France favour the
continuation of the inspections and a substantial
reinforcement of their human and technical capacities
through all possible means and in liaison with the
inspectors, in the framework of the U.N. resolution 1441.
There is still an alternative to war. The use of force can
only be considered as a last resort. Russia, Germany and
France are determined to ensure that everything possible is
done to disarm Iraq peacefully.
For the inspections to be completed, it is up to Iraq to
actively cooperate with the IAEA and the UNMOVIC. Iraq
must fully accept its responsibilities.
Russia, Germany and France note that the position they
are expressing is similar to that of a large number of
countries within the Security Council.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18

28

512

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

the United States considered Resolution 1441 as an important
aspect of ―setting the conditions‖ for the use-of-force
authorization that it sought, but ultimately failed, to obtain.98
In selecting this legal authorization course of action, the
United States accepted the burden of persuading other
members of the Security Council not only that the use of
military force against Iraq was justified as a collective security
enforcement measure under Article 42 of the Charter, but also
that the use of force must proceed according to a timetable
dictated by the United States and its Coalition partners.99
Perhaps the Bush Administration genuinely believed that
it would prevail in carrying this burden of persuasion.
Certainly the build-up to the causus belli presentation by
Secretary of State Colin Powell reflected an all-out effort by the
United States to satisfy this burden.100 While there has been
much criticism directed at the veracity of the information
presented, there has been little consideration of the practical
corner the United States effectively backed itself into through
this process. By accepting the burden of persuasion, the
United States conceded to opponents of military action the de
facto power to define both legality and legitimacy. Only by
satisfying this burden vis-a-vis the four other permanent
members of the Security Council101—and thereby eliminating
Id.
98. Colin Powell, Sec‘y of State, Address to the United Nations Security
Council (Feb. 5, 2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.
99. Bush‟s Speech on Iraq: “Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave”,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A14.
100. See Powell‟s Address, Presenting “Deeply Troubling” Evidence on
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A18.
101. The composition of the Security Council is set forth as the following:
The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the
United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America shall be permanent members of the Security
Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other
Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent
members of the Security Council, due regard being specially
paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of
the United Nations to the maintenance of international
peace and security and to the other purposes of the
Organization, and also to equitable geographical
distribution.
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the risk of veto—could the United States achieve the objective
that it imposed upon itself to obtain a use-of-force resolution.102
Certainly, achieving this objective would have provided a
virtually indisputable international legal basis for military
action against Iraq, eviscerating opposition to the action. In
this regard, the effort does appear logical. However, the
consequences of failing to obtain such an unassailable legal
basis for military action calls into question the wisdom of the
legal strategy adopted by the United States.
Consider the ultimate consequence of this course of action.
The United States made a determined effort to obtain a new
use-of-force resolution.103 Nonetheless, opponents of the war,
the timetable, or both, remained unconvinced that such an
authorization was justified. As a result, several permanent
members of the Security Council made it well known that
should the United States or the United Kingdom table a use-of-

U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
The voting process for the Security Council is as follows:
Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain
from voting.
U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 1-3.
102. It is, perhaps, possible that the Bush Administration actually
anticipated the ultimate failure to achieve Security Council consensus on the
need for military action against Iraq. Perhaps this was part of a broader
strategy to marginalize the significance of the Council. This seems somewhat
consistent with President Bush‘s reaction to the inability to obtain a new useof-force resolution, in which he condemned the collective security process as a
failure. However, it seems far more plausible that the President genuinely
believed that Secretary of State Powell‘s presentation would produce the
desired consensus.
103. United States Reportedly Gaining Security Council Support, UN
WIRE,
Oct.
25,
2002,
http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20021025/29875_story.asp.
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force resolution, they would exercise their veto power to ensure
it did not pass.104 As the conflict drew ever closer based on the
timetable announced by President Bush, the United States was
left with few options. It could test the commitment of these
opponents to the conflict by tabling a new use-of-force
resolution; but if their opposition proved genuine, the result
would be disastrous—a failed use-of-force resolution on the eve
of initiating the conflict. As is now well-known, the United
States and its coalition partners chose not to assume this risk.
Instead, they accepted the inability to satisfy the burden of
persuasion, condemned the collective security process as a
failure, and then resorted to a questionable theory as their
international legal basis for the military action that was, by
that point, inevitable.
Thus, while avoiding the most
problematic outcome—the inability to obtain passage of a new
use-of-force resolution—the course of action pursued by the
United States ultimately armed opponents to Operation Iraqi
Freedom with the ability to assert international illegality as
the result of the decision by the United States to abandon the
Security Council process.105
It is plausible to argue that, by initially attempting to
obtain a use-of-force resolution, the United States validated the
benefit of the collective security process. An equally plausible
argument, however, recognizes that, by abandoning that
process, the United States undermined the credibility of the
U.N. collective security system. Neither judgment is relevant
to this analysis.
Instead, the potential consequence of
approaching the conflict with Iraq from a different perspective,
and thereby shifting the burden of persuasion from the
proponent of military action to the opponents, will be
104. See Germany Rules Out Iraq War Support, BBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 22,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2682313.stm (Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder declared that Germany intended to abstain in a future vote in the
Security Council. Germany does not have veto power in the Security
Council). See also Quelles Que Soient Les Circonstances, la France Votera
Non [Whatever the Circumstances, France Will Vote No], LE MONDE, Mar. 11,
2003
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2003/03/11/quelles-que-soient-lescirconstances-la-france-votera-non_312437_3210.html
(President
Chirac
stated that ―France will vote ‗no‘ because she considers this evening that
there is no need to make a war to achieve the goal we set ourselves, that is to
say the disarmament of Iraq‖ (translated by author)).
105. See Tyler & Barringer, supra note 44.

31

2010]

INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY

515

considered.
IV. Enhancing Legitimacy by Shifting the Pragmatic Burden
of Persuasion Through the Auspices of Article 51
It is a well-established tenet of international law that the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense codified
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides limited authority to
engage in armed action absent
Security Council
106
This authority, however, has been historically
authorization.
limited to a response to actual or imminent armed attack.107
Although the concept of an imminent attack has traditionally
been narrowly interpreted, it is plausible that the United
States could have proffered this rationale as a legal basis for
military action against Iraq.
Indeed, the United States
suggested that it was invoking this authority, at least in part,
in the notice it ultimately submitted to the Security Council
after Operation Iraqi Freedom began.108
It is not the intent of this essay to extensively critique the
legitimacy of this theory of legality. Indeed, this field has been
thoroughly plowed by scholars following the start of the Iraq
war, with many concluding that Article 51 never provided a
viable legal basis for war.109 It is, however, indisputable that
the United States did perceive a self-defense necessity for
military action, and that some scholars endorsed the assertion
of this right and the expanded interpretation of ―imminent
threat‖ inherent in this invocation.110 What is far more
106. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 212 (―The Security Council is
the sole international organ mentioned in Article 51. Nevertheless . . . the
legitimacy of recourse to self-defence may also be explored—in appropriate
circumstances—by the International Court of Justice. . . . The Court [has held
that] because self-defence is a right, it has legal dimensions and judicial
proceedings [that] are not foreclosed in consequence of the authority of the
Council.‖).
107. Id. at 182 (arguing that a ―mere threat‖ does not justify a state‘s
use of force).
108. See Letter from the Permanent Representative, supra note 51.
109. See generally, e.g., Glennon, supra note 59; Schmitt, supra note 68;
Stahn, supra note 95.
110. See Christian Henderson, The Bush Doctrine: From Theory to
Practice, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3, 16, 24 (2004) (stating that unilateral
preemption by the United States against Iraq was unwarranted but with
appropriate Security Council resolutions the doctrine could be legitimately
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significant for this analysis is the decision of the United States
not to rely primarily on Article 51 as a right of action. Because
the primary basis ultimately relied on by the United States—
that the military action was authorized by Resolutions 678 and
687—was itself of questionable legitimacy, the important
question of whether approaching the legality and legitimacy
challenge from the alternate direction of self-defense would
have provided a more effective policy posture for the United
States is raised.111 Certainly the same factors that the United
used in the future); Charles Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 33 DEN. J. INT‘L L. &
POL‘Y 150, 174 (2004); Adam Tait, The Legal War: A Justification For
Military Action in Iraq, 9 GONZ. J. INT‘L L. 96 (2005); John Yoo, International
Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 563, 574–75 (2003).
111. The potential negative impact such an assertion might have had on
the creation of the ―coalition of the willing‖ is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, it is certainly plausible that nations inclined to join the United
States in the effort to effect regime change in Iraq would find a self-defense
based theory of legality an unacceptably expansive view of the Charter
paradigm, which would undermine their willingness to provide support. This
perception has been summarized by one author as follows:
It cannot be said that the law has evolved to the point of
allowing for the use of force in the absence of Security
Council authorization. Such evolution would stand the
Charter system on its head by placing the burden of
terminating such action on the Council, while permitting
any permanent member to prevent the Council from
interfering.
Stahn, supra note 95, at 812 (internal citations omitted). There is no doubt
that the United States could have used its veto power to ensure that the
Security Council did not take action to halt a military operation justified on
the grounds of self-defense. However, the dialogue and debate that might
have surrounded such an effort by opponents of the conflict, while not
binding, would have had a significant impact on the perceived legitimacy of
the United States‘ claim. Thus, had the United States and the United
Kingdom confronted near unanimous opposition from the Security Council,
and been forced to employ the veto to defeat a resolution demanding
termination of military operations, the legitimacy of the action would have
been severely undermined.
However, substantial division among the
members of the Security Council, with opponents of the military action
unable to garner near unanimous support for their efforts to demand
termination of the action—an equally plausible scenario—would have greatly
enhanced the credibility of the United States‘ assertions. Indeed, even Stahn
acknowledges that the diplomatic interaction that takes place at the Security
Council in relation to use of force decisions, even when states act on their own
initiative, plays an important role in determining the ultimate legitimacy of a
use of force action:
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States relied upon in its attempt to persuade the Security
Council that military action was not only necessary and
justified, but also could not be delayed, would have supported
such a theory. The focus of debate would have therefore been
narrowed to one issue: the meaning of ―imminent‖ threat.
Even a cursory review of practice and scholarship related
to the Article 51 right of self-defense indicates that the concept
of an imminent threat has traditionally been confined to acts
against an enemy who is about to launch an attack—not one
that is merely in the preparatory stages of such an attack.112
The line between these two markers has never been conclusive,
and there has always been a tension between the need of states
to protect their territories and populations, and the risk of
acting prematurely with the consequence of initiating a conflict
that might have been avoided. The Six-Day War of 1967
provides a classic example of the diplomatic risk associated
with a national judgment that a threat has attained a level of
imminence justifying the exercise of self-defense. That war
began when Israel launched a pre-emptive strike on a number
of Arab states which Israel determined were massed and poised
to launch an imminent strike.
The decision to initiate
hostilities was the result of Israel‘s determination that an Arab
attack was inevitable, and that waiting for an actual initiation
of hostilities by the Arab states would produce a strategic
catastrophe, endangering Israel‘s very existence.113 Therefore,
Israel launched the attack that resulted in a resounding
victory, and asserted the inherent right of self-defense as the
legal basis for its action. However, even in the face of
compelling evidence supporting the Israeli judgment of

But this evolution has initiated a departure from the formal
framework of the Charter by transforming the Council de
facto from an executive authority presiding over
authorization of the use of force to an arbiter of the
lawfulness of nonauthorized action that uses various
techniques of explicit or implicit post hoc endorsement to
assess the consequences of its own displacement.
Id.
112. See generally U.N. Comm. on the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N.
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
113. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 242.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18

34

518

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

imminence and the potential consequences of inaction, many
states condemned Israel for an unjustified invocation of selfdefense that produced an act of aggression.114
What is the lesson to be drawn from Israel‘s experience?
One apparent consequence was Israel‘s reluctance to follow the
same path six years later when Arab forces were again massing
in opposition. That decision is viewed by some historians as
producing the greatest threat to Israel in its history: the Yom
Kippur War.115 Whether Israel was right in the first instance
and wrong in the second, or vice versa, is not critically relevant
for this discussion. What is relevant is the reality that any
invocation of the inherent right of self-defense in response to a
threat, short of an actual armed attack, involves an inherent
diplomatic and informational risk of condemnation by the
Security Council. Thus, once a state determines that use of
force is necessary to achieve a vital national security interest,
risk of perceived international illegality is inherent in either
the collective security process or in the assertion of the right of
self-defense.
The ultimate difference between these two
courses of action is the potential impact of the pragmatic
information burden of persuasion.
The juxtaposed examples of the Six-Day War and the Yom
Kippur War provide an instructive illustration of this dynamic.
In attempting to achieve the perception of legitimacy by acting
clearly within the collective security paradigm, Israel assumed
tremendous strategic risk in 1973 by foregoing the benefits of
preemption against its Arab enemies. This was motivated in
large measure by the consequences of that same operational
strategy six years earlier. But did Israel gain any meaningful
advantage by accepting this risk? Some might debate this
point, but it seems difficult to ignore the historical record:
Israel‘s effort to avoid the international approbation triggered
by its pre-emptive strike in 1967 almost produced a strategic
catastrophe, but reaped virtually no informational benefits.116
114. See id. at 241-42. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 192
(responding to the view that Israel‘s use of force was unjustified and pointing
out that Israel ―reasonably interpreted‖ and acted upon the information
available at the time).
115. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 321 (noting that Israel suffered 2,838
deaths and 8,800 injuries and lost 103 aircraft and 840 tanks in the Yom
Kippur War).
116. See id. at 319 (discussing the faulty assumptions made by Israel in
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As in 1967, Israel stood alone operationally during the conflict,
and could rely upon only the United States to provide the
critical support necessary to prevail. In fact, it was only when
it became clear that Israeli forces had withstood the initial
Arab onslaught and were poised to make substantial strategic
gains against Egypt and Syria that the Security Council
process became somewhat effective.117
Since 1973, whenever Israel has chosen to act militarily
against a perceived threat, it has done so through an assertion
of its inherent right of self-defense. These assertions are often
met with criticism.118 However, this pattern of behavior
suggests that the lesson learned by Israel, as a result of the
Six-Day War—Yom Kippur War dichotomy, was that criticism
is virtually guaranteed whenever military force is used against
a threat, irrespective of the asserted legal basis. Invoking the
inherent right of self-defense, therefore, not only preserves the
sovereign‘s prerogative to decide when military action should
be initiated, but it also places the burden of proving illegality
on Israel‘s opponents. More importantly, short of a Security
Council resolution condemning such an invocation and
requiring a termination of hostilities, debate over the
legitimacy of the invocation remains just that: debate.
Within this broader context, the diplomatic strategy
adopted vis-a-vis Operation Iraqi Freedom seems more suspect.
It certainly raises the question of whether nations, like the
United States, have a not-so-subtle incentive to press for
expansion of the historically uncertain limits of the concept of
an imminent threat as a valid justification for an action in selfdefense. In this regard, the nature of the threat faced by a
state, and perhaps more importantly, the anticipated
consequences of complying with a narrow definition of
imminence, seem to be valid considerations in the
interpretation and implementation of this right. Even former
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan implicitly acknowledged
its decision to refrain from attacking and the general intelligence failure of
the Israel Defense Force).
117. See id. at 321-22.
118. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 230 (―No country in the world seems
to have adhered more consistently to a policy of defensive armed reprisals
than the State of Israel. For those who negate the entire concept of defensive
armed reprisals under the Charter, all acts labelled [sic] as such are lumped
together in one mass of illegality.‖).
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the necessity of ensuring that the definition of an imminent
threat matches the realities of the contemporary strategic
environment. In an article that discussed the future of the
United Nations, Annan stated: ―[T]oday we also face dangers
that are not imminent but that could materialize with little or
no warning and might culminate in nightmare scenarios if left
unaddressed.‖119 With regard to Iraq, such a contextual
definition of imminence should have allowed consideration of
the potentially catastrophic consequences of delaying military
action, the potential for Iraq to continue its efforts to acquire or
produce WMD, and the potential transfer of those weapons to
terrorist enemies of the United States. In short, from the
perspective of a state determined to exercise its inherent right
to defend itself, at what point does such a threat become
imminent?
This theory was in fact central to the United States in its
National Security Strategy of 2002.120 According to that
document:
We must adapt the concept of imminent
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‘s
adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not
seek to attack using conventional means. They
know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely
on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of
weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can
be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used
without warning.121
This strategy statement indicates the perceived necessity
on the part of the United States to ensure that the concept of
an imminent threat, as related to the exercise of the right of
self-defense, evolves to effectively address emerging
119. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom”: Decision Time at the U.N., 84
FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2005, at 63, 69.
120. See generally NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
(2003), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-onterrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf; PETER PACE, CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION (2002), available at www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMSCWMD2006.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 82.
121. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 82, at 15.
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transnational terrorist threats. In fact, this evolution is
reflected in the joint resolution passed by Congress in 2002,
which authorized the use of military force against Iraq, and
that, in addition to citing Resolution 678 as a legal basis for
military action, also included the following provision:
Whereas Iraq‘s demonstrated capability and
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction,
the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either
employ those weapons to launch a surprise
attack against the United States or its Armed
Forces or provide them to international terrorists
who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of
harm that would result to the United States and
its citizens from such an attack, combine to
justify action by the United States to defend
itself . . .122
In retrospect, the failure to validate the asserted presence
of WMD renders it tempting to conclude that no valid basis
existed for the United States to assert an inherent right of selfdefense as its justification for military action against Iraq.
However, this alternate theory must be critiqued
prospectively—not retrospectively. At the time the United
States decided to initiate military action, the perceived
imminence of the threat posed by Iraq clearly motivated that
decision. In fact, the perception of ―imminence‖ seems to have
been corroborated by the United States‘s unwillingness to
acquiesce to suggestions that the requested Security Council
action be postponed in order to provide additional time for the
inspection process.
What if the United States had adopted the same approach
that Israel adopted in 1967—namely, to unequivocally assert
that it intended to act against Iraq pursuant to its inherent
right of self-defense? Such an assertion would have no doubt
generated opposition from members of the international
community. However, unlike the course of action adopted by
the United States, this approach would have placed the burden
122. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1499 (2002).
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of ―proving‖ illegality onto the opponents of the military action,
and would have allowed the United States to defend a theory,
rather than to obtain a consensus.
In this regard, it is once again instructive to consider the
construction of Article 51. As previously noted, Article 51
acknowledges the sovereign prerogative of member states to
make judgments as to when action in individual or collective
self-defense is necessary. However, the article also apparently
acknowledges that this prerogative is subject to abuse. It
therefore provides that member states must report to the
Security Council any action taken pursuant to such an
assertion of authority. Furthermore, it provides that the
Security Council may, in a sense, ―assume‖ responsibility for
the situation that resulted in the purported self-defense action.
These aspects of Article 51, when read in conjunction with
Articles 39, 41, and 42, provide a mechanism to check the
abusive or unjustified exercise of the right of self-defense.
As a result, reliance by the United States on Article 51 as a
legal basis for the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom would
have led to two immediate consequences. First, it would have
focused the debate on one clear issue: the meaning of imminent
threat. This focus could have conceivably accrued to the
benefit of the United States and other allies who supported
military action. The litany of evidence indicating Iraqi noncompliance with international legal obligations would have
supported the assertion that Iraq must be regarded as
unpredictable. Of course, critics of the United States‘s position
would have undoubtedly pointed to the years of containment as
evidence that Iraq did not pose a genuine threat to the United
States. However, the new element of a transnational terrorist
group with an avowed determination to conduct mass casualty
attacks against the United States and other coalition partners,
and with a demonstrated ability to do so, could have been cited
as a factor that rendered the past evidence relatively
insignificant to the imminent threat equation. Furthermore,
the United States would have been in the position to proffer the
anticipated devastating consequences of ―getting it wrong,‖ and
opponents would have been forced to call into question the
apparent legitimate U.S. interest of protecting its territory and
population. The fact that the United States had actually been
the victim of ―getting it wrong‖ on 9/11 would have no doubt
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enhanced the credibility of such a position.
The second immediate impact would have been that
opponents of the United States‘s assertion of a self-defense
justification would have carried a practical burden of building a
consensus of opposition. They would likely have initiated this
effort by arguing that, absent an actual attack by Iraq, military
action by the United States without express Security Council
authorization should be presumed illegal, and that the United
States bore the burden of establishing otherwise. From a pure
international law standpoint, this argument may indeed be
perfectly legitimate. However, at a practical informational and
diplomatic level, the challenge for opponents to military action
would have been more complex. These opponents would have
confronted the same reality that disabled the U.S. effort to
build consensus around authorizing military action: securing
such consensus is no easy task among the community of
nations, and it is certainly a significant burden for the Security
Council.
The United States could have asserted full
compliance with Article 51 by reporting the proposed action to
the Security Council. Doing so would have then have imposed
a burden on its opponents to establish their own consensus at
the Security Council to oppose the United States‘s invocation of
its right to defend itself.
It is of course axiomatic that the veto powers of the United
States and the United Kingdom would have ensured that no
resolution in opposition to the U.S. position could have
prevailed. However, the United States and its partners could
have allowed the process to run its course. This would have
forced opponents at the Security Council to do more than
threaten a veto of a use-of-force resolution—it would have
forced the opponents to actually table a resolution challenging
the validity of the United States‘s judgment as to the nature of
this emerging threat, and to then generate enough support for
that resolution to make the United States‘s use of its veto
power appear wholly invalid.
Whether Security Council
opponents to military action could have mustered the national
will necessary to take such an action is highly questionable.
Even assuming such a resolution was proposed, it is highly
unlikely that it would have received anything close to
unanimous support. Instead, it is probable that the vote would
have been extremely divided. Thus, instead of providing
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opponents to military action the opportunity to defeat the U.S.
policy with one vote, the United States would have been able to
assert that a divided vote in opposition to its interpretation of
the right of self-defense fell far short of a conclusive rejection of
that determination.
This process would have had the
additional benefit of allowing the United States to legitimately
assert that military action was conducted consistently with the
use-of-force paradigm reflected in the U.N. Charter, and
thereby undermine the credibility of any accusation that the
United States was dismissing the value of that paradigm. This
process would have also enabled the United States to assert
that it had validated the role of the Security Council as a check
on the exercise of self-defense, which would have offset any
assertion that the United States had set into motion a process
whereby states would routinely rely upon Article 51 as a
subterfuge for engaging in military aggression.
It seems clear that the United States made a reasoned
decision not to rely exclusively upon an assertion of the right of
self-defense as a basis for military action against Iraq. Why
this was the case is a matter of speculation, but likely reasons
included the potential resistance by other members of the
―coalition of the willing,‖ or the concern that establishing a selfdefense precedent might be abused by other states in the
future. It is just as likely, however, that the legal course of
action selected was the result of hubris on the part of the Bush
Administration, confident that it would prevail with its burden
of persuading other members of the Security Council that a
new authorization for military action against Iraq was
necessary, and that it must accommodate the U.S. military
timetable. Of course, ―hindsight is 20/20,‖ but it is clear that
whatever the motive for selecting the new authorization
approach, the United States failed to establish a credible legal
basis for the military action. Perhaps even more troubling,
accepting the burden of persuasion, and subsequently failing to
meet that burden, forced the United States to publicly condemn
the efficacy of the U.N. collective security process—a
cornerstone of post-Cold War U.S. strategic policy.
Considering the loss of international credibility suffered by
the United States as a result of being perceived as dismissive of
international law, the damage to the credibility of the U.N.
collective security system, and the political consequence
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confronted by those states determined to stand beside the
United States in its effort to force regime change in Iraq, it is
difficult to conclude that a self-defense-based approach to the
use-of-force decision vis-a-vis Iraq would have been
substantially riskier. Might this approach have provided
traditional allies struggling to justify the instinct to support
the United States a more viable basis to make that leap of
faith?
This question appears to be taking on renewed relevance
as the United States and other like-minded countries confront
the reality of an increasingly belligerent North Korea who is
poised to possess nuclear weapons with long-range delivery
capability. In light of the fact that President Obama has
already announced that North Korea cannot be allowed to
possess such a capability, the possibility that the United States
will decide to launch a military strike against North Korea is
far from speculation. Like President Bush in 2002, if President
Obama reaches this decision point, he will be forced to confront
a diplomatic reality: the issue of North Korean proliferation
has been within the purview of the Security Council for more
than a decade, in large measure due to the insistence of the
United States. Will this functionally lock the United States
into a collective security authorization legal strategy? If it
does, what will be the consequence of failing to prevail in
persuading other Security Council members of the need for
such an authorization? Perhaps more importantly, do the
diplomatic and information risks associated with that course of
action—risks that were validated by the United States‘s
experience with Operation Iraqi Freedom—create an incentive
for the United States to bypass that process altogether and to
take its proverbial chances by invoking a right of action
pursuant to Article 51? The answer to this question should,
and almost inevitably will, depend in large measure on the
intelligence preparation of the diplomatic battlefield, and the
potential payoff that such an approach would hold for
developing a perception of international credibility. It is to this
issue that the Article will now turn.
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V. The Enhanced ―Supportability‖ of the
Self-Defense Theory of Action
While reluctance and resistance to the U.S. effort to
generate support for Operation Iraqi Freedom existed in
various degrees throughout the globe, Europe clearly
dominated the limelight as the primary obstructer of the
effort.123 The relatively strong influence that Europe has on
world politics and its tradition of cooperation with the United
States in international conflicts explains why it was so
influential on the overall perception of legitimacy for ousting
Saddam Hussein from power. The apparent ultimate rejection
of that process, with the accordant emphasis of the ―coalition of
the willing,‖ is an example of the consequence of being
perceived as operating outside the accepted norms of
international law in relation to the use of force. This section
considers the impact that a self-defense based theory of legality
might have had on the ―supportability‖ of the conflict by other
states. This consideration is important not only to suggest that
such a theory might have proven more effective from an
international political standpoint, but also because it reflects a
potential benefit of reliance on this theory in future military
actions in support of national security objectives. A discussion
on how European states and key institutions may have
perceived and responded to this alternative approach does not
lend itself to a precise and distinct account, as there are far too
many plausible outcomes. Instead, the complexities associated
with each nation and organization‘s unique policies and
decision-making processes suggest a broad alternative
discussion. Hence, the value of this discourse is to identify
arguments that indicate a shift in support of the United States
with reference to the course of action it pursued together with
its coalition partners.
During a 2005 visit to Europe, President Bush called for
unity in support of the emerging democracy in Iraq.124 This
call was a response to the reality that, more than two years
123. See Stahn, supra note 95, at 806 n.10 (citing numerous legal
journals and news reports reflecting European opposition to the United
States‘s policy).
124. See Michael A. Fletcher & Keith B. Richburg, Bush Seeks to Mend
Transatlantic Rift, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at A1.
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after the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the rift
between the United States and many of its traditional
European partners continued to impact transatlantic relations.
While European leaders applauded the elections in Iraq and
the efforts of the people of that country to establish a
democratic state,125 there remained a general unwillingness on
their part to retroactively endorse the legal theory proffered by
the United States to justify the conflict. A significant issue
related to the development of this rift involved differences over
the international legal authority for the initiation of the
conflict.126
In retrospect it is clear that the United States
underestimated the persuasion required to muster sufficient
European support.
Still, the Bush Administration was
cognizant of such challenges and of the need to produce
arguments that appealed to the other side of the Atlantic.
When confronted by European media during the run-up to the
Iraq War, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld elaborated on
the importance of persuasion of European allies based on his
experience as Ambassador to NATO:
[W]hen we would go in and make a proposal,
there wouldn‘t be unanimity. There wouldn‘t
even be understanding. And we‘d have to be
persuasive. We‘d have to show reasons. We‘d
have to—have to give rationales. We‘d have to
show facts. And, by golly, I found that Europe on
any major issue is given—if there‘s leadership
and if you‘re right, and if your facts are
persuasive, Europe responds. And they always
have.127
125. See World Leaders Praise Iraq Elections, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 31,
2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-01-31-iraq-worldreax_x.htm.
126. See generally Philip H. Gordon, Iraq: The Transatlantic Debate, 39
EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR SECURITY STUDIES OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (2002),
available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/article/iraq-thetransatlanticdebate/philip%20h.%20gordon/?tx_ttnews[cboAuteurs]=ALL&tx_ttnews[chkA
rea][0]=allarea&tx_ttnews[chkType][0]=22&tx_ttnews[cboMois]=10&tx_ttne
ws[cboAn]=1990&cHash=c18c0920d9.
127. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Briefs at the Foreign Press
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Later during the address Rumsfeld coined the delineation
between the ―old‖ and the ―new‖ Europe, which raised strong
reactions on the other side of the Atlantic, and which would
become an obstacle in itself toward reaching transatlantic
Notwithstanding this simplistic division of
consensus.128
Europe, there was a clear split amongst European states. The
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland and many small
countries sided with the United States, while the ardent
opposition was spearheaded by France and Germany, and
supported by Greece, Belgium and other small countries.129
Whenever a state adopts a theory of legality for the use of
force, it must consider the consequences that policy will have
on the state‘s relations with other members of the community
of nations.
For a state committed to emphasizing its
commitment to the rule of law in the international
community—like the United States—this consideration is an
essential component of the national security decision-making
process related to the use of force. To this end, the United
States, as the only superpower, had a unique ability to leverage
its position. When powerful states invite weaker states to join
their position, a strategic calculus takes place as to whether
the cost of opposing the stronger state is greater than the gain
of joining it. Whether the motive for not supporting the U.S.led endeavor involved a lack of widespread public support,
unsubstantiated intelligence, economic interests, domestic
politics, or a reliance on U.N. inspectors, governments
invariably also considered the self-evident benefits of standing
alongside the United States. There was also a potential
domestic and international political payoff inherent in
participating in the creation of a new era for the Iraqi people—
an aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom consistent with the
Center
(Jan.
22,
2003),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330.
128. See Outrage at “Old Europe” Remarks, BBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 23,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm.
129. See Jürgen Schuster & Herbert Maier, The Rift: Explaining
Europe‟s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on
Iraq, 2 FOREIGN POL‘Y ANALYSIS 229, 238 (2006). See also Greece Plans Iraq
Emergency
Summit,
BBCNEWS.COM,
Feb.
10,
2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2744375.stm (follow ―Clickable Map‖ link
located within the article‘s text).

45

2010]

INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY

529

traditional European commitment of respect for human rights.
The result of these competing interests was an obvious
dilemma confronted by most European governments when they
deliberated whether to support, oppose, or remain neutral visa-vis the inevitable conflict.
Notably, while joining the
stronger state—a phenomenon referred to in political science as
―Bandwagoning‖130—often provides a compelling option, it also
necessitates the offering of incentives, something that many
Europeans would argue were in short supply during the run-up
to the Iraqi intervention.
Research suggests that while traditional power politics ran
its course in the East, Western Europe revealed another
dynamic that required a different incentive. Their divide ran
alongside the political orientations of governments, with liberal
ideologies overrepresented in opposition of the United States.131
For these liberal states, the idea of lending active support to a
military endeavor in Iraq became an insurmountable cost to
bear under the circumstances. A military campaign would not
only have terminated the United Nations‘s most tangible effort
to resolve the situation—its Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission (―UNMOVIC‖)132—it also suggested
that all of the other options at the disposal of the international
community were exhausted. When the head of UNMOVIC,
Hans Blix, and others continued their advocacy for prolonged
inspections, new benchmarks, and revised timelines, the
domestic burden of proof for those liberal leaders deliberating
national costs easily tilted to the benefit of the politically safe
option—despite the perceived threat posed by Saddam
Hussein. Indeed, it became impossible to erect sufficient
support for a military operation based on collective security
theory. Moreover, the collective security approach allowed
those in opposition to effectively seize the moral high ground at
the expense of the United States and its allies. While reliance
on a self-defense theory of legality would have certainly
130. The competing option for Bandwagoning is balance of power. For a
discussion on the subject, see generally STEPHEN WALT, THE ORIGINS OF
ALLIANCES (1987).
131. See generally Schuster & Maier, supra note 129, at 233.
132. UNMOVIC was created by the U.N. Security Council, see S.C. Res.
1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999) (establishing UNMOVIC as a
subsidiary body of the Council and replacing the Special Commission that
had been established by S.C. Res. 687). See also infra note 164.
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generated international opposition, it is interesting to consider
whether this ―shifted-burden‖ approach might have offered
liberal governments seeking a rational basis to support the
United States a more viable basis to do so. Arguably, a U.S.
narrative with a legal basis rooted in self-defense would not
have changed the European reluctance towards a military
invasion, but it may have significantly relaxed the
requirements of political commitment, as it would not have
required unequivocal support for the United States and its
partners. In fact, this option could have allowed European
politicians to voice mild concerns about a forthcoming invasion
to satisfy their domestic audience, without challenging the
United States‘s inherent right of self-defense. This is not to say
that all Europeans would have sided with the United States,
but it would have lowered the threshold for those whose
political calculus included more than one plausible outcome. A
self-defense justification would also have avoided the
perception that the United States held a confrontational
posture toward the United Nations, an organization cherished
by so many Europeans.133
To further unpack the European resistance, it is helpful to
examine the competing option to Bandwagoning: balance of
power. Put simply, the United States wanted the United
Nations to relinquish the international community‘s authority
to deal with the situation with few, if any, incentives with
regards to power and control. With this view, Rumsfeld‘s
miscalculation of ―old Europe‖ as irrelevant becomes apparent.
In 2003, five of the fifteen members of the U.N. Security
Council were European.
In addition to the permanent
members, France, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Germany,
and Spain each had seats at the table.134 It is not surprising
that the most vocal resistance came from some of the members
133. The Treaty on the European Union (―TEU‖), entered into force in
1993, includes a definition of foreign policy objectives that put emphasis on
the role of the United Nations and the U.N. Charter: ―[T]o safeguard the
common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter . . . to
preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter . . . .‖ E.U. Charter art. 11.1.
134. Press Release, Membership of Principal United Nations Organs in
2003,
U.N.
Doc.
ORG/1371
(Oct.
1,
2003),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/org1371.doc.htm.
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of this group. Even Tony Blair, an early proponent of taking
military action, was adamant on his preference for
authorization through the United Nations. Europeans saw
little benefit in surrendering control of the situation through
their representatives in the Security Council. This perception
was manifested in a European Union Council Declaration in
the midst of transatlantic consultations, which emphasized
that those nations were ―committed to the United Nations
remaining at the centre of the international order.‖135
By pursuing collective security as its legal basis, the
United States forced many European states to choose between
two incompatible options: the safe option of continued political
relevance and influence over the process through the United
Nations, and indirectly through the European Union; or the
risky option of taking a stand for a U.S.-led intervention and
implicitly sharing the burden of risk while surrendering the
ability to influence the process following a Security Council
decision supporting collective security. Since many of these
states were regarded as ―old Europe,‖ any hopes of recognition
and relevance in future transatlantic relations were
understandably modest. Had a Security Council-endorsed
invasion failed in some way—for example, by a failure to find
or take possession of Iraqi WMD—the Security Council
decision and its supporters would almost certainly be
scrutinized and subjected to harsh criticism. Hence, given the
circumstances, it can be argued that the United States had
asked for a lot, particularly since President Bush had claimed
that the international community was risk-adverse on this
issue.136 Advancing inherent self-defense as its legal basis
would not have called for a U.N. Security Council ruling.
Instead, counter to the propositions related to balance-ofpower, this could have given members of the United Nations
135. See Extraordinary European Council at Brussels Presidency
Conclusions (EC) No. 6466/03 of 17 Feb. 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/7455
4.pdf.
136. Specifically, President Bush said that ―[i]t is important to know
that the Iraq is an extension of the war on terror. . . . The international
community is risk adverse. But I assure you I am going to stay plenty
tough.‖ SCOTT MCCLELLAN, WHAT HAPPENED: INSIDE THE BUSH WHITE HOUSE
AND WASHINGTON‘S CULTURE OF DECEPTION 139 (2008) (quoting President
George W. Bush, Address to Republican Governors (Sept. 20, 2002)).
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and the rest of the international community a comfortable
position as ―bystanders,‖ who could form and articulate their
view at the time of their convenience, without bearing any of
the political risks or responsibilities, and, at the same time,
without the ability to influence the process. In the case of
France, it is unlikely that it would have been attracted by
being sidelined. President Jacques Chirac‘s clear ‗non‘137 to a
military intervention, as reflected in French media on March
11, 2003, at the pinnacle of the diplomatic quarrel, came as no
surprise. It was consistent with the policy he had articulated
six months earlier in an interview with the New York Times.138
Neither was his position unavoidable. Despite the rhetoric,
France was considering, and possibly preparing for, military
options.139 The French policy was premised by two key
propositions: a rejection of unilateralism and an absence of a
clear and present danger. Both propositions enjoyed broad
appeal in Europe. A self-defense approach would have taken
the edge off of the latter argument, since it narrowed the scope
to threats against the United States and avoided competing
with European threat perceptions. Hence, drawing upon the
provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and self-defense as
a legal basis might have provided a more viable basis for
European governments to leverage support in favor of taking
action in line with U.S. plans. Consequently, an approach
based on Article 51 rests on the assumption that the United
States would have been able to gain more support, or at least
at a minimum, less resistance, for the action the United States
deemed necessary to counter the threat that Iraq posed.
The first French proposition, unilateralism, encapsulated
the depth of the Euro-American divide in that the countries did
not share a common view of the world or the utility of power.
American foreign policy commentator Robert Kagan argues
that, while Europe has entered a post-historical paradise of
peace and relative prosperity, the United States remains
anchored in history, where military power still has an essential
137. See Quelles Que Soient Les Circonstances, la France Votera Non,
supra note 104.
138. See French Leader Offers America Both Friendship and Criticism,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A9.
139. See David Styan, Jacques Chirac‟s „Non‟: France, Iraq and the
United Nations, 1991-2003, 12 MOD. & CONTEMP. FR. 371, 380-81 (2004).
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role to play.140 The senior European Union (―E.U.‖) diplomat
Robert Cooper offers another discourse as he postulates that
Europe is a ―postmodern‖ continent that has moved beyond the
balance-of-power
system
towards
co-existence
and
cooperation.141 This system has elevated the application of
international law to a level close to that of national law. In this
context, the U.N. Charter stands as the chief guardian against
unilateral and unlawful actions against international peace
and security. Consistent with this view is the European
Parliament‘s nonbinding resolution passed in January 2003,
which rejected a unilateral U.S.-led military intervention
against Iraq: ―[A] pre-emptive strike would not be in
accordance with international law and the UN Charter and
would lead to a deeper crisis involving other countries in the
region . . .‖142
The selection of legal theory for the conflict becomes
critical. Regardless of the official theory ultimately endorsed
by the United States, the reversion to reliance on Resolution
678 at a late stage created a powerful perception that the
United States had in fact rejected the collective security
mechanism of the United Nations.
As a result some
governments were constrained, not only by policy concerns, but
also by national laws prohibiting support for Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as the result of this apparent deviation from the
accepted legal framework. In fairness, the European states are
neither a homogeneous group, nor entrenched in their
positions.
For example, despite its commitment to
international law, Europe allowed itself to bend its principles
during the Kosovo campaign against Serbia.143 Not only was
this operation employed by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (―NATO‖), but it was supported by the European
140. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA VS.
EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003).
141. See generally ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER
AND CHAOS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004).
142. See European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Iraq, EUR.
PARL.
DOC.
P5_TA
0032
(2003),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20040405/p5_ta(200
3)0032_en.pdf.
143. See Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and Nato‟s Application of
Armed Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INT‘L & COMP.
L.Q. 330, 340 (2000). See also supra note 133.
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Union, despite the lack of U.N. Security Council authorization.
The European Council Declaration that offered support to the
intervention did so from a self-defense, humanitarian and
historical perspective.144 Indeed mindful of its history, the
notion of self-defense resonates in Europe.
As the Iraqi crisis emerged, the communicated rationale
for taking military action revolved around three areas: Saddam
Hussein‘s oppression of the Iraqi people, Iraq‘s possession of
WMD and its willingness to use them, and the risk of Saddam
Hussein rendering aid and protection to transnational terrorist
organizations, including members of Al Qaeda. These two
latter considerations would have formed the basis for an
assertion of self-defense authority individually, and even more
so, when combined. As discussed above, they provided the core
of the joint resolution passed by Congress in 2002 authorizing
the use of military force against Iraq.145 The underpinnings
were not unsupported in Europe, at least on a principal level.
In the aftermath of the Iraqi rift, the Europeans crafted their
first Security Strategy in an effort to demonstrate unity.146
Despite the apparent fundamental differences between the
144. See European Council at Berlin Presidency Conclusions (EC) No.
SN
100/99,
at
30
(1999),
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACF
B2.html. The Council stated that:
On the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot
tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It cannot
be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant
population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and
subjected to grave human rights abuses. We, the countries
of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to
ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which
became tangible in the massacre at Racak in January 1999,
are not repeated. We have a duty to ensure the return to
their homes of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and
displaced persons. Aggression must not be rewarded. An
aggressor must know that he will have to pay a high price.
That is the lesson to be learnt from the 20th century.
Id.
145. It must be emphasized that the validity of the intelligence
underpinning the United States‘s policy is beyond the scope of this Article,
and this alternate theory must be critiqued prospectively.
146. See generally A Secure Europe in a Better World (EC), No. 10881/03
of
June
25,
2003,
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
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United States and Europe on power and world order, as
discussed above, the contrast may in part be a case of prejudice
in both directions. Research comparing the American and
European strategies acknowledges divergence in their
mindsets.147 However, it concludes that the U.S. agenda was
guided by idealistic values whereas the European strategy
appeared more realistic.148 The European strategy document
reveals common ground that was never seized during
diplomatic efforts.
Consistent with the United States‘s
assessment, the European strategy singled out terrorism and
proliferation of WMD as key threats.149 The strategy also
supported the notion of exercising self-defense outside its own
borders, and specifically noted that the first line of defense will
often be abroad.150
Despite the disagreement on the pre-emptive doctrine
employed by the United States, the European view called for
early, rapid, and, when necessary, robust interventions, as well
as the importance of being ready to act before a crisis occurs
(although the latter is not necessarily related to military
interventions). While it would be naïve to suggest that these
differences could have been completely bridged by applying a
self-defense option, it can be argued that there was potential to
better leverage the arguments under such a theory.
Another credible rationale for asserting self-defense as the
legal basis must take the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a point of
departure. Following the attacks, the international community
extended wide support to the United States, and through the
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373,151 initiated
by France, the United States gained legitimacy to take
responsive actions. Moreover, on September 12, 2001, the
North Atlantic Council (―NAC‖) of NATO decided to invoke
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty152 for the first time in the
Alliance‘s history. Notably, Article 5 makes specific references
147. See Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, Mapping the Mind Gap: A
Comparison of US and European Security Strategies, 36 SECURITY DIALOGUE
71, 89 (2005).
148. See id.
149. See A Secure Europe in a Better World, supra note 146.
150. See id.
151. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
152. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
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to the right of collective self-defense as laid out in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.153 The seventeen European allies and
Canada had concluded that the Al Qaeda-sponsored terrorist
attacks against the United States were considered attacks
However, this
against all of NATO‘s member states.154
willingness to provide support based on collective self-defense
was never leveraged by the Bush Administration. Instead, the
Bush Administration employed military power against the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan in a manner that failed to
exploit the benefits of collective self-defense, and accordingly,
rejected troop contributions from several traditional NATO
allies. Despite the lack of interest in utilizing collective
measures in accordance with the NATO Treaty and the U.N.
Charter, the Bush Administration asserted self-defense as the
legal justification for launching Operation Enduring Freedom.
Accordingly, a notification was issued to the Security Council
stating that the United States was acting in self-defense.
Following the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom,155 the
European Union gave its ―staunchest support for the military
operations‖ and underlined its legitimacy under the U.N.
Charter.156
Despite a selective approach in engaging traditional
European allies and partners, the ad hoc cooperation that
eventually came to fruition after major combat operations
ended in Afghanistan was the broadest coalition ever formed.
However, what the coalition had gained in width, it had lost in
depth.
The lack of consultation prior to deploying in
153. Id.
154. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO],
Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
155. On October 7, 2001, President Bush announced the launch of
Operation Enduring Freedom. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Oct.
7,
2001),
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.
The
operation was an integral part of the larger Global War on Terror, with the
legal basis provided by a Senate Joint Resolution. See S.J. Res. 23, 107th
Cong. (2001).
156. Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European
Union and the President of the Commission, Follow-Up to the September 11
Attacks and the Fight Against Terrorism (EC) No. SN 4296/2/01 of Oct. 19,
2001,
at
1,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/terrorism/documents/conseil_gand_en.
pdf.
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Afghanistan and the feeling that they had been marginalized
became sources of frustration for traditional European allies
and partners. Moreover, the initial hardships and successes
became primarily U.S. and U.K. commodities, and did not
provide a cohesive bond within the wider community of
traditional allies and partners. Instead, a growing rift between
the United States and several European allies developed and
the two continents drifted apart in their perceptions on how to
best address terrorist threats.
This was reflected in a
statement issued by the European Union in the midst of
transatlantic consultations indicating that it did not support a
broad theory of self-defense as a legal basis for more
widespread military operations related to the Global War on
Terror.157 Instead it emphasized that ―the United Nations
remain[s] at the centre of the international order.‖158
Indeed, the time period between 9/11 and the initiation of
the United States‘s diplomatic effort to obtain Security Council
support for Operation Iraqi Freedom represents a missed
opportunity to build a shared notion of collective self-defense as
a legal basis for military efforts aimed at defeating terrorism.
Had the United States exploited the invocation of Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty in support of Operation Enduring Freedom,
it would have defined a new formula for collective self-defense
against terrorism. Such a modus operandi could have paved
the way for a similar approach against Saddam Hussein, and
setting the legal conditions for Operation Iraqi Freedom would
have formed the next step in this theory of collective defense
against terrorism.
At this critical juncture, governments inclined to oppose
the United States‘s plans to effect regime change in Iraq would
have borne the burden of articulating the illegality of the selfdefense theory, and as a result, would have found it more
difficult to convey persuasive arguments against the
established method of collective self-defense. Certainly, the
challenge of convincing additional European states of Saddam
Hussein‘s links to Al Qaeda would have remained. However,
because the burden of proof would have shifted, the United
States would have been in a stronger political position; once
157. Extraordinary European
Conclusions, supra note 135.
158. Id. at 1.
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notice of the theory and evidence in support of the conclusion
had been published, inaction by other states could have been
treated as acquiescence to the theory of legality. In this regard,
it is significant to consider that at the time the United States
began to articulate its rationale for Operation Iraqi Freedom,
no credible evidence that de-linked Saddam Hussein from his
alleged terrorist affiliations was offered by any state opposing
the looming conflict. Furthermore, Resolution 1441, adopted
unanimously in November 2002, condemned Iraq for its
continuing ties to terrorism159—a fact that seems relevant in
support of a self-defense theory of legality.
These facts, and the shifted burden of persuasion, would
not have prevented some nations from opposing the United
States‘s plans.
However, rather than having pressure
accumulate against the United States as the result of the
Security Council‘s inaction, that same inaction would have
shifted attention to those nations detracting from the United
States‘s theory of legitimacy. Furthermore, had the United
States capitalized on its allies‘ invocation of Article 5 of the
NATO Treaty based on the precedent that might have been
established in relation to Operation Enduring Freedom, the
focus of debate could very easily have been shifted to the
question of whether such invocation was legitimate under the
circumstances, as opposed to the focus that actually did develop
at the Security Council.
European polls conducted in January 2003, before the
commencement of hostilities, indicated overwhelming public
opposition throughout Europe—ranging from sixty-eight
percent to eighty-eight percent—against going to war without
an additional Security Council Resolution.160 However, the
opposition to war in the event that a new U.N. resolution was
agreed upon was considerably lower, ranging from twelve to
seventy-two percent, with all the E.U. countries at fifty percent
or below.161 Notably, the opposition in France was less than
159. See generally S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52.
160. See William Horsley, Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War,
BBCNEWS.COM., Feb. 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm
(follow ―Graphical Data‖ link located within the article‘s text).
161. See id. (follow ―Graphical Data‖) (noting that a January 2003
European Omnibus Survey found that, among European nations, only
Austria, Finland, and Greece reported resistance levels to a U.N.-mandated
mission well above fifty percent).
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thirty percent.162 Yet several leaders—like Tony Blair (United
Kingdom), Jose Maria Aznar (Spain), and Leszek Miller
(Poland)—decided to seek their nations‘ support to contribute
to Operation Iraqi Freedom without a credible U.N. Security
Council resolution. It is interesting to note that empirical
research suggests that public opinion cannot account for the
path chosen by these governments.163
Had NATO previously achieved the success associated
with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan through the
collective defense process—as opposed to the ―coalition of the
willing‖ concept actually relied upon by the United States in
that conflict—European governments might have been able to
leverage that example in support of an effort to galvanize
public support for a similar endeavor in Iraq. Arguably,
several traditional European allies and partners had as large a
problem with the perceived cavalier approach to coalition
building practiced by the United States in both Afghanistan
and Iraq as they did with the de facto legal justifications for
going to war.
The very clear signals from the Bush
Administration that conflicted to effect regime change in Iraq
were inevitable, regardless of the opposition from numerous
traditional supporters of U.S. foreign policy, engendered even
more entrenched opposition in several European capitals,
which was exacerbated by the reaction of the media and
widespread public opposition to the United States.
Had the United States asserted a self-defense-based
rationale in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom—with the
stated objective of removing the Hussein regime because of its
established record of non-compliance with international legal
obligations related to WMD and its alleged sponsorship of
terrorism164—the diplomatic outcome might have been
162. Id. (follow ―Graphical Data‖).
163. See Schuster & Maier, supra note 129, at 223.
164. After the Gulf War cease fire, Resolution 687 defined the terms of
the cease fire and required Iraqi acceptance of those terms. See S.C. Res.
687, supra note 49. The resolution addressed both terrorism and WMD. Id.
Moreover, an inspection and destruction regime was established for
eliminating the WMD threat. The U.N. Special Commission (―UNSCOM‖)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (―IAEA‖) performed their
missions until Saddam Hussein refused to grant inspectors access in 1998.
At that time, ―it could not be excluded . . . that there still existed undeclared
missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.‖ HANS BLIX, DISARMING
IRAQ 29 (2004). The United States and the United Kingdom responded with
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different. Certainly, many nations who ultimately opposed
military action seemed to support the effort to determine the
nature of the Iraqi threat. For example, according to its foreign
minister, even France attempted to leverage all available
intelligence in its possession.165 The United States‘s inability
to prove a positive—that Iraq did indeed possess WMD—was
easily exploited by opponents to the U.S. policy precisely
because the United States had accepted the burden of proving
that Iraq constituted a threat to international peace and
security. However, it was equally plausible—and perhaps even
more rational—to focus on the lack of evidence to prove the
negative—that Iraq did not possess WMD. This absence of
proof of non-possession, when linked to Iraq‘s long history of
evading U.N. disarmament efforts and violating international
obligations, could certainly have been relied upon to assert that
Iraq represented a presumptive threat to the United States,
requiring opponents of the conflict to rebut that presumption—
had the United States not accepted the burden of persuasion.
Ironically, it is fair to say that, at the time the United
States initiated the collective security process, most European
intelligence agencies concurred in the assessment that Iraq
still possessed WMD. Opposition to the United States‘s
assertion of its right to act in self-defense, particularly when
such a policy was supported by the United Kingdom and
endorsed by the U.S. Congress, would have not only required a
masterful articulation of the absence of evidence, but also a
direct challenge to the right of two prominent members of the
community of nations to make the judgment of when such

military force (Operation Desert Fox) to degrade Iraq‘s ability to produce,
store, maintain, and deliver WMD. Although a new inspection regime was
set up in late 1999, see S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999),
it would take another three years until the inspection teams of the U.N.
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (―UNMOVIC‖) could be
deployed. In the final report by UNMOVIC on March 7, 2003, the Executive
Chairman, Hans Blix, could not conclude whether or not Iraq had disarmed.
This ultimately led Secretary Rumsfeld to make the oft-quoted remark that
―the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,‖ a comment that seems to
reflect a pragmatic characterization of the burden shifting theory addressed
in this Article. Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks at Department of
Defense
News
Briefing
(Feb.
12,
2002),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
See also BLIX, supra, at 112.
165. See DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, TOWARD A NEW WORLD 42 (2004).
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action was required. In short, opponents would have been
placed in the difficult position of asserting that the policy of
self-defense for a superpower, supported by the world‘s most
capable intelligence community, should be dismissed based on
speculation. In this regard, it seems that rejection of such a
legal basis could have represented as significant a threat to the
viability of the inherent right of self-defense reflected in Article
51 as the abuse of that right represents to the collective
security paradigm.
Such an outcome would not be
advantageous for any state, particularly smaller ones.
The other aspect of utilizing the theory of self-defense that
might have accrued to the diplomatic benefit of the United
States would have resulted from invocation of the U.N.
Charter. This might have resulted in more European support,
even if the interpretation of Article 51 was subject to criticism.
It seems clear that European governments, as well as their
people, generally view the U.N. Charter as the fundamental
cornerstone of international peace and security. This is
reflected in the results of polls regarding military action
against Iraq. When Europeans were asked to express their
views regarding unilateral military action by the United
States, the results indicated a support level of only eighteen
percent, at the same time that sixty-six percent of the
interviewees confirmed that Iraq was a threat to world
peace.166
However, when asked to express their views
regarding military action in accordance with the U.N. Charter,
support increased substantially.167
VI. Conclusion
The United States‘s decision to invoke the collective
security process of the U.N. Charter, and thereby to accept the
burden of persuasion on the international diplomatic plane,
and then to subsequently abandon that process when it became
clear that it could not carry this burden, resulted in numerous
direct and derivative undesired effects. It propelled the United
166. See European Liberal Youth, Europeans Against War on Iraq
Without
UN
Mandate,
http://www.lymec.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=161
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2009).
167. See id.
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States to proffer the ―coalition of the willing‖ as a
manifestation of international legitimacy for Operation Iraqi
Freedom. It also forced the United States to rely on Security
Council resolutions dating back to the first Gulf War as a legal
basis for military action. This reliance led to a blurring of the
line between collective security and self-defense as a rationale
for military action, with the United States asserting the role of
de facto enforcer of the collective security interests of the
international community, despite the fact that the collective
security mechanism of that community chose not to endorse
such enforcement. This ultimately resulted in that mechanism
being marginalized altogether. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, it presented traditional security partners with a
dilemma resulting from the desire to follow the traditional path
of supporting the United States, and the requirement to
manifest respect for international law. This rendered it
virtually impossible for several European governments inclined
to support the United States to do so.
Despite the Bush Administration‘s dismissal of the efficacy
of the United Nations during the lead-up to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, continuing support for the ―Charter security
paradigm‖ was clearly manifested by the strained
interpretation of Gulf War Security Council resolutions that
were ultimately relied upon by the United States as legal bases
for the conflict. It therefore seems plausible that a theory of
legality firmly rooted in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, with
the accordant shift of the burden of persuasion to opponents of
the inevitable conflict, might have enhanced the perceived
international legitimacy of the military action, and thus
accommodated the interest of the United States in avoiding
any endorsement of theories involving use-of-force legality that
were not nested within the Charter paradigm. Such an
approach would have immediately shifted the burden of
persuasion to the opponents of military action, who would have
been in the difficult position of articulating why, within the
broader context of the terrorist threat manifested by the
attacks of September 11, the United States was unjustified in
effecting regime change to ensure security from a rogue state
believed to possess exactly the type of mass casualty
capabilities so obviously coveted by terrorist organizations.
Such a diplomatic approach to the conflict would have most
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effectively exploited the Charter paradigm from an information
operations perspective, and potentially resulted in enhanced
support from traditional allies and partners—even if these
states might have been troubled by the United States‘s
interpretation of that article.
If the United States is yet again faced with a national
security dilemma involving threats of imminent attacks by
North Korea or other actors, the United States should, from the
outset, compare and contrast the two principal avenues of
approach related to collective security and inherent selfdefense, respectively, as its legal basis for accomplishing its
strategic objective.
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